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THE CHANGING AMERICAN RULE AGAINST ATTORNEY
FEE SHIFTING: MILLS v. ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE CO.
AND HALL v. COLE
by Steven J. Corey
Traditionally American courts disfavor allowance of attorneys' fees to the
successful litigant. However, the courts do not always follow this anti-fee-
shifting doctrine, and in certain situations will add attorneys' fees as costs to
the losing party either through judicially created exceptions to the doctrine
or pursuant to statutory provisions. The exceptions created by the courts
are based upon the courts' equity power,' while under some circumstances
federal and state legislation require the award of fees to the prevailing party.
It is also common practice to insert attorney fee clauses in contracts, notes,
mortgages, and similar instruments, whereby one party agrees to reimburse
the other party for counsel fees and expenses if litigation occurs. In this
situation the courts will usually uphold the parties intentions and enforce the
promise. 2 However, a greater impact on the general rule against fee shifting
has been made by the "substantial benefit" theory adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.3 and expanded by the
Court in Hall v. Cole.4 The purpose of this Comment is to explore the "sub-
stantial benefit" rationale, explain why it has altered the traditional rule, and
project the changes which should occur, not only in litigation based upon con-
gressional and state legislation, but also in litigation based upon contract and
other nonstatutory areas of the law.
I. GENERAL RULE AND THE TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS
The idea that attorneys' fees should not be taxed to the losing party be-
came well established early in the history of the American judicial system.5
Our frontier society was characterized by a rugged individualistic spirit, for
the very existence of the pioneer depended upon his ability alone to cope
with the particular situation. When legal disputes arose, those involved re-
lied upon themselves to achieve justice inside the courtroom, or outside it,
1. For a complete examination of this equitable power to grant costs, see Guardian
Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 241 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on other
grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1929). The court made an exhaustive study of the limits of equityjurisdiction and concluded that the federal courts of equity clearly have jurisdiction to
allow costs as between attorney and client.
2. There is no question that parties may contract to pay the fees of another, but
issues arise in interpreting the scope of such contracts. Eastman v. Sunset Park Land
Co., 35 Cal. App. 628, 170 P. 642 (1917).
3. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
4. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
5. Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV.
1216, 1219 (1967).
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rather than upon lawyers. Thus, the lawyer was considered a luxury, the
cost of which should be paid by the litigant who employed him.6 In addition
to becoming a part of tradition, the general rule has been defended on the
grounds that it enhances predictability and encourages the resolution of dis-
putes through the courts.
As our civilization became urbanized and concern for the individual7 gave
way to concern for society in general, reform of our judicial system, includ-
ing its rules pertaining to attorneys' fees, received increasing attention.8  As
a result, the traditional rule has been somewhat eroded, and attorneys' fees
may now be awarded when the successful litigant contracts in advance for
such an award, 9 is a victim of groundless litigation,'0 brings suit under spe-
cific provisions of statutes providing for an award of fees, 1 or creates, in-
creases, or protects a fund which is to be shared by others.12
Many federal statutes specifically authorize payment of attorneys' fees to
the successful litigant in cases in which there is a violation of the statute by
the defendant, 13 or when the plaintiff's action forces the defendant to comply
with an order from an administrative agency. 14  For example, Congress has
provided for the recovery of fees by the winning litigant in actions to enforce
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission against carriers for payment
of money, 5 in actions for infringement of the copyright law,' 6 and in suits to
recover for injury caused by a violation of the antitrust laws." 7 A consider-
able number of state statutes allow fee shifting, the most common of which
include claims against carriers for freight overcharges, damage to freight
shipped, and damage to property along their lines.' 8
The traditional judicial exceptions typically arise under two major cate-
6. Id. at 1220.
7. Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees after Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 316 (1971).
8. Note, supra note 5, at 1221.
9. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
10. Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233 (1928), rev'd on other
grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1929). Typically, the winning party must bring a second action
to recover reasonable attorneys' fees from the loser. Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in
Costs: A Logical Development, 38 COLo. L. REV. 202 (1966). Supporting this ex-
ception is the belief that if the party abusing the system is required to pay lawyers' fees
for both parties, it will deter such abuse. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a
Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REV. 75, 80 (1963).
11. See notes 13-18 infra and accompanying text.
12. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1882); see notes 21-24 infra and
accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
H9 9(e), 18(a), 15 U.S.C. H§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1970); Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 206 (1970); Interstate Commerce Act, § 16, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970).
14. See, e.g., Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970); Perishable Ag-
ricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1970); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.§ 153(p) (1970); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970).
15. 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Other federal statutes allowing counsel fees to private
litigants include: Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970); Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77www(1970); Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1970).
18. MINN. STAT. § 219.33 (1945) (damages from failure to maintain fences); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 221.251 (Supp. 1965) (tariff overcharge); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art.
2226 (Supp. 1971) (tariff overcharges and damaged freight); id. art. 6393 (1926)(freight damaged at depot).
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gories. First, if a party brings groundless litigation against another, the
courts may utilize their equitable power to charge counsel fees to the losing
party.19 The second category, termed the "common fund category," relates
to situations in which the plaintiff's suit creates, increases, or protects a fund
which is within the court's jurisdiction and to which others are entitled to
share. The United States Supreme Court as early as 1882, in Trustees v.
Greenough,20 recognized that failure to award attorneys' fees to the success-
ful plaintiff who by his litigation creates a fund which benefits others, gives
an unfair advantage to the other parties entitled to participate in the fund.
The crucial factor is success since the courts award fees only when litigation
is successful. 21 Creditors' suits are the most common illustration of this ex-
ception and typically the fund is created by setting aside fraudulent trans-
fers of property by an insolvent debtor, by establishing the right of the insol-
vent debtor in certain property, or by defeating groundless claims against
him. 22 Attorneys' fees are allowed to be paid from the fund, not to punish
the loser but to avoid the granting of an unfair advantage to the non-liti-
gant beneficiaries. In reality, expenses of the successful litigant are not paid
by the unsuccessful party, but by the other beneficiaries who must contrib-
ute to the litigation expenses of the particular beneficiary who brought the
suit.23  The courts deem the "common fund" exception necessary since, if
the complainant had to bear the whole expense, the sum could easily ex-
ceed his portion of the fund, while others who did not participate in the ac-
tion would receive a larger dividend due to the plaintiff's efforts. Individual
creditors would be deterred from initiating proceedings. Thus, the "common
fund" exception invites the individual to champion the rights of those who
have a common interest with him.24
II. THE EXPANSION OF THE TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS
Building upon the "fund" rationale, the courts began to allow attorneys'
fees not only in situations where no fund was involved, but also allowed fee
shifting under statutes which did not specifically provide for such. To sub-
stantiate this expansion it was necessary that the courts evade the fund re-
quirement and overcome legislative silence.25
A. The Benefit Rationale
The Constructive Fund. In Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank26 the plain-
tiff established her rights to a trust, and in so doing established the rights of
fourteen other persons who were not parties to the suit. The action was
19. See note 10 supra.
20. 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1882).
21. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards,
69 HARV. L. REV. 658, 659 (1956).
22. Id. at 662.
23. 105 U.S. at 532. By charging fees to the fund before distribution, members of
the class benefited by the litigation contribute their proportionate share of the expense.
24. Hornstein, supra note 21, at 662.
25. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). See also Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
26. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
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brought by the plaintiff to segregate a fund which she had deposited in trust
in a bank which became insolvent. Under the strict fund exception, the
plaintiff is required to sue on behalf of a class and create or protect a fund
which is to be distributed to other members of the class. While no fund was
created in the traditional sense, the Court refused to restrict the "fund" excep-
tion to its established limits and held that the plaintiff had an equitable right
to reasonable attorneys' fees. 27  The fact that one professes to sue repre-
sentatively was held not to affect the court's equity power to grant attorneys'
fees.28 It is unclear whether the Supreme Court intended to delete the strict
fund requirements completely, or merely to hold that both requirements
were constructively met through the principle of stare decisis. It is clear
that Sprague indicated a willingness by the Court to broaden the fund excep-
tion, a factor which encouraged further relaxation of the fund requirement.
Law Enforcement as Benefit. After the Supreme Court's decision in Sprague
the relaxation of the fund requirement continued in the state courts, and it
was there that the formalities significantly yielded to the "newly emerging
policy imperatives. '29  In Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp.30 the New York
Supreme Court held law enforcement to be a sufficient benefit to those simi-
larly situated to the plaintiff to justify an award of attorneys' fees to the
plaintiff even though no fund was created.8' The plaintiff, a bondholder
and stockholder of a corporation, sued the corporation individually and on
behalf of all bondholders and stockholders similarly situated to prevent the
completion of an ultra vires transaction. At common law commission of ul-
tra vires acts is not only outside the law, but it can entail harm to the corpo-
ration, stockholders, and creditors.3 2  The court found it irrelevant that the
suit created no fund for the corporation or its security holders, or that the
corporation or security holders would be financially better off if the ultra
vires act had been performed. 3 The court stressed the benefit of law en-
27. Id. at 166. In the words of the Court:[T]he usual case is one where through the complainant's efforts a fund is
recovered in which others share. Sometimes the complainant avowedly
sues for the common interest while in others his litigation results in a fund
for a group though he did not profess to be their representative. The pres-
ent case presents a variant of the latter situation. In her main suit the pe-
titioner neither avowed herself to be the representative of a class nor did
she automatically establish a fund in which others could participate. Butin view of the consequences of stare decisis, the petitioner by establishing
her claim necessarily established the claims of fourteen other trusts per-
taining to the same bonds.
Id.
28. Id. The costs of litigation other than the conventional taxable costs is part of
the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in certain situations. Id.; see note
1 supra.
29. Comment, supra note 7, at 326. One who enforces the law benefits those who
are protected by the law, and as a matter of policy, those who are benefited should con-
tribute to the cost of enforcement. Id.
30. 97 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
31. Id. at 499.
32. Id. at 495. The court recognized that at common law a stockholder may suein the corporation's behalf to restrain its commitment of an ultra vires act, and such
restraint is deemed in law to be protection of and beneficial to the corporation and its
security holders even though the act may be economically advantageous to the corpora-
tion. Id.
33. Id. at 497.
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forcement: "The law cannot refuse to recognize as beneficial full observ-
ance of the law. The law cannot hold that corporate interests are better
served by action outside rather than within the law. The law must assume
that compliance rather than non-compliance ... better advantaged [the cor-
poration] and its security holders."'84  The court emphasized 'that the domi-
nant consideration is the production of the benefit and not its form, for it is
only the production of the benefit that casts upon those others the duty of
sharing in the cost of that production."5
Although Abrams held law enforcement to be a sufficient benefit to those
similarly situated to the plaintiff to justify fee shifting, the decision did not
provide any guidelines for determining which individuals are similarly situ-
ated to the plaintiff. Likewise, the court failed to specify what degree of bene-
fit must inure to these individuals before the awarding of attorneys' fees to
the plaintiff becomes proper. It is doubtful that the court intended that the
slightest benefit to any class should trigger fee shifting. However, since the
court failed to set out any definitive guidelines, the opinion could be so in-
terpreted.
Substantial Benefit. In Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Ass'n36
the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the rationale of Abrams, but limited
its application to cases where law enforcement resulted in a substantial bene-
fit. In that case the corporation reimbursed 'attorneys' fees to a stockholder
who brought a derivative action against directors and counsel of the defend-
ant corporation and obtained a judicial declaration that the election of cer-
tain directors and a proposed amendment to the corporate bylaws were il-
legal. The court determined that this suit was of substantial benefit to the
corporation because it served as a deterrent to irresponsible leadership.
Thus, it was ordered that the corporation which was the principle beneficiary
of the corrective action should bear the expense of the litigation.37 However,
the court also recognized that awarding counsel fees against a corporation in
every instance where the directors act outside of their corporate powers would
invite nuisance suits. Therefore, the holding was limited by the stipulation
that the derivative actions be instituted in good faith to correct or prevent mis-
conduct and be of "substantial" benefit to the corporation .3 The Bosch
opinion indicates that in order to justify an award of attorneys' fees, the
trier of fact must find that the alleged benefit is "more than technical in its
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
37. Id. at 426. Extensive reliance was placed on a number of articles by GeorgeHornstein, who believed that actions to prevent ultra vires acts which may entail hazards
to the corporation and its security holders serve to maintain the "health of the corpora-
tion." Since ultra vires conduct of corporate officers is harmful to the corporation, a
stockholder is permitted to prosecute a suit to correct a wrong or prevent a threatened
wrong to his corporation even though such action does not result in "pecuniary benefit."
Hornstein believed that the assurance of an award of attorney's fees to the successful
stockholder serves as an inducement for him to take the initiative to challenge the ques-
tionable act. Id. See also Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative
Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 791 (1939).
38. 101 N.W.2d at 426. The trial court determines what is substantial benefit in
light of each case. Id.
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consequences" to the corporation or its shareholders and that the benefit cor-
rects or prevents an abuse which is detrimental to the corporation or an
essential right of the shareholder.39 Unfortunately, the court failed to pro-
vide any insight into the interpretation of these tests and so the guidelines
may vary in application depending upon how narrowly or broadly the
court's language is interpreted by the trier of fact.
B. Congressional Silence
In Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.40 stockholders sued their corporation and
several of its directors pursuant to section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193441 and recovered for the defendant corporation profits realized
by the directors from security trading. Since this was not an action to re-
cover money belonging to the stockholders, a fund was not created in the
traditional sense. However, under the Sprague approach a stockholder who
is successful in enforcing a penalty payable to the corporation is entitled to
reimbursement for reasonable attorneys' fees on the theory that the corpo-
ration which has received the benefit of counsel should pay their reasonable
cost.42 Several sections of the 1934 Act4 3 specifically provide for the recov-
ery of counsel fees, but no mention of fees is made under section 16(b).
Thus, the issue was raised as to whether Congress, by maintaining silence in
section 16(b) with respect to attorneys fees, intended to circumscribe the
courts' equity power to award fees, and, therefore, prevent the application of
court created exceptions to actions arising under section 16(b). The court
resolved the issue holding that the specific remedy provisions in some sec-
tions of ,the statute should not be interpreted as evidencing congressional in-
tent to deny the courts the power to award fees in actions brought under
other sections of the Act which do not mention attorneys' fees. Instead,
those sections specifically providing fees "merely enforce an additional pen-
alty against the wrongdoer. '44
C. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.
Following the decisions in Sprague, Abrams, Bosch, and Smolowe, the
courts were frequently using their equitable power to grant attorneys' fees to
the successful plaintiff. Nevertheless, it was at this point that the United
States Supreme Court in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.45
reversed the trend and not only destroyed the court-created trademark excep-
tion, but also created a reaction which caused the courts .to be reluctant in
applying any court-created exception to actions arising under congressional
legislation. 46  In Fleischmann the defendants deliberately infringed plaintiff's
39. Id. at 427.
40. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
42. 136 F.2d at 241.
43. See §H 9(e), 18(a), 15 U.S.C. 8H 78i(e), 78r(a) (1970).
44. 136 F.2d at 241.
45. 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
46. For cases denying attorneys' fees in suits brought under the Interstate Com-
merce Act, see Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Slayton, 407 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
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Lanham Act 47 trademark rights. There was significant case authority hold-
ing that an award of counsel fees to the successful plaintiff is permissible
when the trademark infringement is "deliberate. '48  However, section 35 of
the Lanham Act 49 provides for recovery to the plaintiff measured by the de-
fendant's profits accruing from his infringement, damages sustained by the
plaintiff, and costs of the action; it does not provide for attorneys' fees. Thus,
the issue was raised as to whether the trial court could award fees under the
judicially created "deliberate trademark infringement" exception in addition to
those in section 35.50 The Court held that the trademark exception was in-
applicable and inferred that the other court-created exceptions were not to be
applied to actions arising under legislation such as the Lanham Act:5 '
The recognized exceptions to the general rule were not . . . developed
in the context of statutory causes of action for which the legislature
had prescribed intricate remedies. Trademark actions under the Lan-
ham Act do occur in such a setting. For, in the Lanham Act, Congress
meticulously detailed the remedies available to a plaintiff who proves
that his valid trademark has been infringed. . . .When a cause of
action has been created by a statute which expressly provides the
remedies for vindication of the cause, other remedies should not readily
be implied. . . . We therefore must conclude that Congress intended§ 35 of the Lanham Act to mark the boundaries of the power to award
monetary relief in cases arising under the Act.52
Thus, counsel fees were held not recoverable under the Lanham Act since
the meticulous statutory provisions set forth in section 35 exclude any other
monetary remedies for violation of rights protected by the Act.5"
The Fleischmann holding was interpreted by the lower courts to mean that
statutory silence regarding counsel fees indicates a congressional intent to
circumscribe the courts' equitable power to award fees to the successful plain-
395 U.S. 937 (1969); Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Mackinac Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D.202 (W.D. Mich. 1966). For cases denying fees in suits brought under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, see Chaney v. Western States Title Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 376
(D. Utah 1968); Stevens v. Abbott, Procter & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
48. Baker v. Simmons Co., 325 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1963); Wolfe v. National Lead
Co., 272 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1959); Keller Prods. v. Rubber Linings Corp., 213 F.2d
382 (7th Cir. 1954); Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 205 F.2d
140 (3d Cir. 1953); Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1953).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970). Section 35 provides:
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the
Patent Office shall have been established in any civil action arising under
this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of sec-
tions 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the principles of equity, to
recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plain-
tiff, and (3) the costs of the action. . . In assessing damages the court
may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any
sum above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times
such amount. If the court shall find that the amount of recovery based on
profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion en-
ter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to
the circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the above circum-
stances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty.
50. 386 U.S. at 714.
51. Id. at 717-19.
52. Id. at 719-21.
53. ld. at 714.
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tiff.54  Furthermore, Fleischmann was cited as standing for two proposi-
tions: (1) court-created exceptions to the general rule are inapplicable to
statutory causes of action for which the legislature has provided remedies;",
(2) when an action arises under a statute which expressly provides remedies
in one section, other remedies should not be implied pertaining to other sec-
tions of the statute.5 6 The result in Fleischmann seems antithetical to the
holding of Smolowe, which was interpreted as encouraging the application
of judicially created exceptions to statutory causes of action for which reme-
dies were legislatively provided. The effect on the lower courts became ap-
parent as counsel fees were denied on the basis of Fleischmann in actions
brought under the Interstate Commerce Act and the Securities Act of 1934,
both of which were silent on the question of attorneys' fees in the relevant
sections. 57 It appeared that Fleischmann had initiated an era of conserva-
tism, and thirty years of growth in court-created exceptions had been wiped
out.5s
III. MILLS V. ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE Co. AND HALL V. COLE
When Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.5 9 came before the Supreme Court, the
substantial benefit exception, with law enforcement serving as sufficient
benefit to justify an award of counsel fees, had been established in the state
courts. However, the Supreme Court in Fleischmann had indicated that
such la judicially created exception was inapplicable in actions arising under
statutes which did not expressly provide for the awarding of attorneys' fees.
I In Mills minority shareholders of the defendant, the Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
brought a derivative action on behalf of minority shareholders as a class to
set aside a merger of their company with the Megenthaler Linotype Co.
Since the proxy solicitations for the merger by Auto-Lite's management were
materially misleading and violated section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,60 the Court remanded the action to the district
court for determination of the proper relief and granted the plaintiff an in-
terim award of attorney's fees.
In order to award fees under any judicial exception to the general rule
against fee shifting, the Court had to overcome congressional silence. As in
Smolowe this action had been brought under the statutory authority of sec-
tion 14(a) which was silent on fees, unlike other sections of the 1934 Act. 61
The Supreme Court could have decided Mills in accordance with the Fleisch-
mann doctrine and held that statutory silence indicates congressional intent
to deny fee shifting, and when an action arises under a statute which ex-
pressly provides remedies in one section, other remedies should not be im-
54. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
55. See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Slayton, 407 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 937 (1969); Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Mackinac Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 202
(W.D. Mich. 1966).
56. See Chaney v. Western States Title Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 376 (D. Utah 1968).
57. See note 46 supra.
58. Comment, supra note 7, at 322.
59. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
61. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text.
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plied pertaining to other sections of the statute.6 2 However, the Court did not
follow Fleischmann, but rather held that the absence of express statutory au-
thorization for an award of counsel fees under section 14(a) did not pre-
clude fee shifting. The Court adopted the rationale of Smolowe and noted
that the Second Circuit awarded attorneys' fees in Smolowe despite the lack
of any provision for them in the relevant section, " 'on the theory that the cor-
poration which had received the benefit of the attorney's services should pay
the reasonable value thereof.' ",63 Following the same analysis, Mills held
that Congress' inclusion of specific fee shifting provisions in some sections of
the Act should not be interpreted as denying to the courts their equity power
to award attorneys' fees in suits arising under sections of the Act which do
not provide for fee shifting.64  The Court did not overrule Fleischmann,
but distinguished it from Smolowe by contrasting the legislative remedies.
While Congress in the Lanham Act had "'meticulously detailed the reme-
dies available to a plaintiff'" with the intent of "'marking the boundaries of
the power to award monetary relief,' " the provisions in the Securities Act
lacked such pervasiveness. 65 Thus, the Fleischmann doctrine was held inap-
plicable to the Securities Act in that no intricate statutory remedies were pro-
vided, and the Mills decision limits application of the Fleischmann doctrine
to the Lanham Act and similar legislation which contains pervasive detailing
of remedies available to the plaintiff.6
The Mills decision indicates a change in philosophy since Fleischmann.
The congressional silence in Fleischmann which had been interpreted to pro-
hibit fee shifting was interpreted by Mills as a mandate to apply the court-
created exceptions under appropriate circumstances. Furthermore, Mills
neither contained the broad language of Fleischmann, indicating that excep-
tions to the general rule were limited, nor the limitations that the judicially
created exceptions were inapplicable in a statutory cause of action. It ap-
pears that Mills dictated a reversal in the decision-making process when a re-
medial statute is in question: Where previously the courts started with the
traditional rule against fee shifting and then determined whether the facts
were within an approved exception, now the courts are to start with the
court's equitable power to grant attorneys' fees, placing the burden on the de-
fendant to prove legislative intent to deny an award of fees.0 7
Having surmounted congressional silence, the Court recognized that both
Congress and judges have developed exceptions to the anti-fee-shifting rule
"for situations in which overriding considerations indicate the need for such
a recovery."'68 Such "overriding considerations" were present in Mills be-
cause the plaintiff had successfully maintained a suit "that ['benefited] a
group of others in the same manner as himself" and to allow the others to
benefit from the plaintiff's action without contributing to the litigation costs
62. 386 U.S. at 719.
63. 396 U.S. at 390, quoting Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 241.
64. 396 U.S. at 390-91.
65. Id. at 391; see note 52 supra and accompanying text.
66. 396 U.S. at 391.
67. Comment, supra note 7, at 325.
68. 396 U.S. at 391-92.
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would unjustly enrich the others at ,the plaintiff's expense. 69 Traditionally, fee
shifting in a stockholder's suit was accomplished only under the "fund" ex-
ception, 'but here no monetary recovery was sought. However, concluding
that the lack of a fund from which fees could be paid would not preclude an
award based on the benefit rationale,70 the Court departed from "the tradi-
tional metes and bounds" of the "common fund" doctrine and adopted the
substantial benefit exception developed in Abrams and Bosch.7'1  The lan-
guage of Mills is broader than that of Abrams or Bosch and reimbursement
of fees is to be granted whenever the litigation: "has conferred substantial
benefit on the members of an ascertainable class"; "the court's jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an award of attorney's fees
that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among them"; and "[per-
mitting] the others to obtain full benefit from the plaintiff's efforts without
contributing equally to the litigation expenses would be to enrich the others
unjustly at the plaintiff's expense."'7 2 The Bosch guidelines for determination
of substantial benefit were adopted,73 yet the Supreme Court provided no
more insight into their interpretation than did the Bosch court. Law enforce-
ment was accepted as being substantial enough benefit to justify an award
of fees to stockholder-plaintiffs where no fund or pecuniary benefit is cre-
ated;74 however, neither guidelines nor limitations were delineated to deter-
mine the degree of law enforcement necessary to amount to a substantial
benefit. Furthermore, the Court provided no guidelines for determining
when an "ascertainable" class exists; it was merely held that the corporation
and its stockholders were members of the "ascertainable" class in Mills.
Thus, the language is vague, and until practical guidelines and limitations
are delineated it appears that the Mills doctrine can be construed as broadly
as the courts desire.
Mills, like Bosch, made substantial references to a number of articles by
George Hornstein, who described the problem created by the anti-fee-shift-
ing rule, and who emphasized that fee shifting would benefit both corpora-
69. Id. at 392. The dissemination of misleading proxy solicitations was deceitful
to the stockholders as a group and the action benefited the corporation and all share-
holders. Id.
70. Id. The earliest cases which recognized a right to reimbursement involved liti-
gation that had produced or preserved a "common fund" for the benefit of a group. How-
ever, the court noted that nothing in these cases indicates that the suit must actually
bring money into the court as a prerequisite to the court's power to order reimbursement
of expenses. The court quoted Sprague: " '[T]he foundation for the historic practice
of granting reimbursement for the costs of litigation other than the conventional taxable
costs of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation.'"
Id. at 392-93.
71. Id. at 393-94. The substantial benefit exception had been most common in
shareholders' derivative actions where the courts had increasingly recognized that ex-
penses incurred by one shareholder in vindicating a corporate right of action should be
spread among all shareholders who benefited by such action through an award against
the corporation regardless of whether a monetary recovery had been obtained for the
corporation. Id. at 394. In most of these cases, there was no "common fund" except
in the constructive sense that the court's jurisdiction over the corporation as defendant
made it possible to assess fees against all the shareholders through an award against the
corporation. Id. at 395.
72. Id. at 393-97.
73. Id. at 396; see note 39 and accompanying text.
74. 396 U.S. at 395-96.
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tions and stockholders by facilitating stockholders' suits, thus promoting
fair conduct throughout -the corporate world.75 Homstein labeled the reme-
dy "legal" or "corporate -therapeutics" in describing its function of increasing
law enforcement by shifting fees. 76
By accepting the Hornstein terminology and the rulings of Abrams and
Bosch, the Mills Court justified a stockholder's suit fee exception based only
upon law enforcement policy objectives. 77 However, Mills stated its doc-
trine in terms not limited to stockholders' suits, thus opening the possibility
of fee shifting in all cases where a plaintiff has successfully maintained a
suit "that benefits a group of others in the same manner as himself."' 78  By
broadening the scope of the "law enforcement as benefit" concept and its
area of application by overcoming congressional silence, the Mills Court intro-
duced the potential for significant changes in the traditional American rule.
The United States Supreme Court further developed this potential in its 1973
decision of Hall v. Cole,79 which further broadened the area of application
by applying the substantial benefit rationale to other than a stockholder's
suit.
In Hall a union member criticized union actions and policies and was sub-
sequently expelled on the ground that his criticism violated a union rule. In
passing ,the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 195980 (the
LMRDA), Congress recognized that it was necessary that all union members
be guaranteed "minimum standards of democratic process."'81  The union
member successfully sued the union under section 102 of the LMRDA,8 2
claiming his expulsion violated his right of free speech guaranteed by sec-
tion 101(a)(2) of the Act,83 and the Supreme Court ordered his reinstate-
ment to the union, vindicated his right of free speech, and awarded him at-
torneys' fees. In justifying the award of counsel fees to the plaintiff the Court
followed the analytical approach it took in Mills8 4 by starting with its equitable
power to grant attorneys' fees and then considering whether Congress in-
tended to circumscribe that power.
The union case was held to be clearly governed by the substantial benefit
75. Id. at 392-96. See also note 37 supra. Hornstein defined the problem by com-
paring the stockholders' suit to the case of David and Goliath, with David being unable
to afford the slingshot. Similarly, laws authorizing private actions against corporate de-
fendants are ineffective due to the anti-fee shifting rule since few stockholders can afford
the high cost of corporate litigation and the deliberate delaying tactics of the corporate
defendant. See Hornstein, supra note 21, at 658, Hornstein, supra note 37, at 791.
Hornstein recognized that effective law enforcement requires awarding fees to the suc-
cessful plaintiff as a "necessary concomitant of allowing the stockholder's derivative suit,
which is vital to the exposure and redress of corporate abuse." Id. at 816.
76. Hornstein, supra note 21, at 662-63.
77. 396 U.S. at 396-97.
78. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
79. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970).
81. 105 CONG. REC. 6471 (1959). Prior to passage of the Act congressional find-
ings indicated that in the labor and management fields there had been numerous in-
stances of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of employee's rights, and general failure
to observe high standards of responsibility and ethics. 412 U.S. at 7.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970).
83. Id. § 411(a)(2).
64. &ee Comment., supra note 7, at 325,
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doctrine adopted in Mills.85  The Court in Hall concluded that the union
member should receive an award of counsel fees since his successful litigation
conferred a substantial benefit on the union and its members and the trial
court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit made possible an award
that operated to spread the costs proportionately among the union members.
To allow the other union members to obtain full benefit from the plaintiff's
efforts without contributing equally to the litigation expenses would enrich the
others at the plaintiff's expense.86 Under those circumstances, the reim-
bursement of plaintiff's counsel fees out of the defendant's treasury merely
shifted the cost to " 'the class that has benefited from them and that would
have had to pay them had it brought the suit.' "8s7 The rights enumerated un-
der section 101(a)(2) were considered "vital to the independence of the
[union] membership and the effective and fair operation of the union as the
representative of its membership."8 Therefore, by enforcing the law and
vindicating his right of free speech guaranteed by section 101(a)(2) of the
LMRDA, plaintiff also vindicated the rights of all union members and ren-
dered a substantial benefit to his union as an entity and to all its members.8 9
Thus, the substantial benefit rationale of Mills, which grew out of the stock-
holder's suit, was applied to the totally different area of labor relations,
the union standing in the same relation to the union member as did the cor-
poration in Mills to its shareholders.
Recognizing that Congress has the power to circumscribe the award of at-
torneys' fees, 90 the Court concluded that such congressional power had not
been exercised in the remedy provision of the LMRDA and that the Fleisch-
mann9l doctrine was inapplicable. Unlike section 35 of the Lanham Act, -2
section 102 of the LMRDA broadly authorizes the courts to grant "appropri-
ate" relief, including injunctions, and does not meticulously detail the reme-
dies available to the plaintiff. Therefore, the Court concluded that the lan-
guage of section 102 did not imply an intent to deny to the courts the equit-
able power to grant attorneys' fees in appropriate situations. 93
The Court in Hall also rebutted a second argument based upon legislative
intent. Since Congress expressly authorized fee shifting in sections 201(c) 94
and 501(b)95 of the LMRDA, the defendant contended that the absence of a
85. 412 U.S. at 7. The court first recognized that the federal courts by exercising
their equity powers could award attorney's fees "when the interests of justice so require,"
and that these courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever
"'overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.'" Id. at 5, quoting
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970).
86. 412 U.S. at 5-7; see note 72 supra and accompanying text.
87. 412 U.S. at 7, quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 397
(1970).
88. 412 U.S. at 8, quoting Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777, 780 (2d Cir. 1972).
89. 412 U.S. at 8. Since such lawsuits contribute to the preservation of union de-
mocracy, they are beneficial not only in the immediate impact of the results achieved
but in their implications for the future conduct of the union's affairs. Id. at 8-9.
90. Id. at 9.
91. Under the Fleisdhmann doctrine, court created exceptions are inapplicable to
statutory causes of action for which the legislature has "meticulously" detailed remedies
which do not include attorney's fees. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
92. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
93. 412 U.S. at 10.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 431(c) (1970).
95. Id. § 501(b).
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similar provision in section 102 indicated an intent to preclude fee shifting
in suits brought under that section. 0 Again, the Court relied on a similar
contention in Mills and held that since the inclusion of express fee provisions
in certain sections of the Securities Exchange Act were not interpreted as de-
nying the courts their equity power to award counsel fees in suits under other
sections of the Act, then express provisions in sections 201(c) and 501(b)
of the LMRDA could not deny the courts the power to award counsel fees
under section 102.97 Thus, fee shifting in a successful suit brought under
section 102 was held consistent with the LMRDA and the "historic equitable
power of the federal courts to grant such relief in the interests of justice."98
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILLS DOCTRINE AS EXPANDED
BY HALL V. COLE
In Hall -the Supreme Court had another opportunity to promulgate ade-
quate guidelines for interpreting the broad language of Mills and limiting its
application. Unfortunately, the Court provided no more insight into the ele-
ments of the substantial benefit doctrine than it did in Mills. Instead, it ap-
plied the Mills' rationale to a different factual setting, and, in so doing, ex-
panded the situations in which attorneys' fees may be awarded to the suc-
cessful plaintiff in the absence of a fund before the court. Thus, it appears
that the Hall Court sanctioned a very expansive application of the sub-
stantial benefit doctrine, possibly to include all causes of action arising un-
der federal legislation not meticulously detailing the remedies available to
the successful plaintiff. The need to provide the individual with private law
enforcing power has been recognized and the dominant element in the trial
courts' decision making process appears to be the benefits accorded to so-
ciety by ,the encouragement of such enforcement.
The broad impact of Mills and Hall comes from the benefit language
augmented by the simultaneous adoption of the "therapeutics" principle. 99
Legal therapeutics is based upon deterrence, with the emphasis switched
from public to private action. 10 0 It confronts the problem of prohibitively
high litigation costs, a situation not limited to stockholders' suits. Since the
Supreme Court has allowed the recovery of attorneys' fees in the diverse fac-
tual contexts of Mills and Hall, it seems reasonable to assume that it would
96. 412 U.S. at 10.
97. Id. at 11. The court believed it "untenable" to assert that Congress established
the bill of rights under the LMRDA and then intended to have these rights diminished
by the fact that a wronged union member would be unable to finance litigation:
Not to award counsel fees in cases such as this would be tantamount to re-
pealing the Act itself by frustrating its basic purpose. It is difficult for
individual members of labor unions to stand up and fight those who are
in charge. The latter have the treasury of the union at their command
and the paid union counsel at their beck and call while the member is on
his own. . . . An individual union member could not carry such a heavy
financial burden. Without counsel fees the grant of federal jurisdiction is
but a gesture for few union members could avail themselves of it.
Id. at 13, quoting Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1972).
98. 412 U.S. at 14.
99. See Comment, supra note 7, at 329.
100. Id. See also Hornstein, supra note 21, at 663.
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sanction the allowance of attorneys' fees to private litigants who bring suits
for the betterment of themselves and others in areas such as civil rights,
consumer protection, and air pollution.' 0 ' The following examples illustrate
the actual and potential impact of the expansive Mills-Hall development.
Private actions challenging administrative decisions pursuant to regulations
protect against weak enforcement of pollution laws, but are discouraged due
to the high cost of litigation. However, in Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil v. Environmental Protection Agency (NRDC v. EPA),10 2 an environmental
group successfully challenged EPA approval of portions of state implementa-
tion plans and the court awarded counsel fees and costs to the plaintiffs for
their efforts in obtaining orders requiring EPA to comply with its obligations
under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.103 The First Circuit cited Mills
in support of the policy favoring the awarding of fees and Hall for authority
to apply that policy to the environmental protection area.10 4  The court
noted: "[W]hen private litigation vindicates a significant public policy and,
at the same time, creates a widespread benefit, policy today favors award-
ing attorney fees against a party who exists to serve or represent the interest
of all those benefited.""'0 ' The EPA was held to be related to the taxpayer
as was the corporation in Mills to its shareholders and the union in Hall to its
members.'0 6 Thus, by requiring the EPA to pay the plaintiffs' counsel fees,
the taxpayer who receives the benefits of the litigation contributes indirectly
to the cost of attaining that benefit. Plaintiffs had championed the policy of
the Clean Air Amendments and had compelled strict compliance by the EPA
with legislation designed to deter pollution.' 07 As a result, policies of the
EPA had been corrected, the law had been enforced, refined, and clarified,
and statutory goals had been achieved. 108 Therefore:
[I]t seems fair and sensible that the EPA should be taxed for [plain-
tiffs'] reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. The EPA has been assigned
by Congress the task of supervising pollution control. It handles the
public funds appropriated for that purpose. To allocate [plaintiff's]
reasonable costs and attorneys' fees to it is to spread them ultimately
among the taxpaying public, which receives the benefits of this liti-
gation.' 0 9
101. See Comment, supra note 7, at 328-29.
102. 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973). Following Mills but prior to Hall the applica-
tion of the Mills doctrine to administrative decisions regarding pollution laws was pre-
dicted in Comment, supra note 7, at 328-30, and the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit relied heavily on that article in formulating its opinion. For further application
of the substantial benefit exception to environmental law, see La Raza Unida v. Volpe,
337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Wright, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness
Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CoRNELL L. REV. 1222 (1973).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
104. 484 F.2d at 1333-34.
105. Id. at 1333.
106. Id. at 1334.
107. Id. The court considered the public suit the most instrumental in enforcing the
statute against the EPA because only the public, not the polluter, has the incentive to
complain about the EPA's inadequacy. Yet the court also recognized that the high liti-





The Court in NRDC v. EPA was faced with the problem of sovereign im-
munity which was not present in Mills or Hall. This doctrine prevents a
court from awarding costs or counsel fees against the federal government or
one of its agencies unless Congress provides specific statutory sanction. 110
Section 304(d) of ,the Clean Air Act"' sanctions the award of counsel fees in
any suit brought under section 304(a),"12 which allows a citizen to sue
where there is an 'alleged failure of the Administrator to perform a non-discre-
tionary duty. However, section 304 on its face deals only with litigation in
the district court' 13 and this case was brought pursuant to section 307,
114
which requires that petitions for review of implementation plan approval be
filed in the court of appeals. The court interpreted section 304(a) to include
a petition filed under section 307 as an action pursuant to section 304(a),
since that section sets forth the authorization for and conditions of suit and
section 307 only directs that some proceedings be brought in the circuit
courts. 1 5 The basis of this interpretation was the court's belief that Congress
intended fee shifting to be available to encourage citizen suits, because with-
out fee shifting many just actions would not be brought due to the fact that
fees could easily be higher than any potential gain. The court reasoned that
legitimate actions brought under section 307 performed as much a public
service as actions pursuant to section 304(a). 116 However, the court warned
that where litigation is "wholly or in substantial part frivolous," neither costs
nor fees would be awarded to the plaintiff. Not all of the plaintiffs' chal-
lenges in NRDC V. EPA were successful, but the court held that since sev-
eral major challenges were successful, the substantial benefit test was met
and plaintiff need not be penalized for losing the other allegations."17
Usually the plaintiff must win the suit in order to receive an award of at-
torneys' fees, but this general rule was not followed by a United States dis-
district court in Sierra Club v. Lynn.1" s In that suit four citizen groups sued
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, charging that the build-
ing of a community development project violated the National Environmental
Policy Act. Even though the suit was unsuccessful, attorneys' fees were
awarded to plaintiffs to be paid by the private developer of the project.
The plaintiffs' position was compared to that of a plaintiff in a civil rights
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970).
112. Id. § 1857h-2(a).
113. Id. See also 484 F.2d at 1331.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970).
115. 484 F.2d at 1335-36.
116. Other cases construing statutes broadly to imply a waiver of the federal govern-
ment's sovereign immunity from assessment of attorneys' fees include: Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 360 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973) (25 U.S.C. §9 175,
476 (1970)); Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1973), modified and a!f'd,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane) (20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1970)). Courts also
have generally not been deterred from awarding fees against public defendants, such as
school boards, state officials, or state bodies. E.g., Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th
Cir. 1973) (state penitentiary board); Griffin v. County School Bd., 363 F.2d 206 (4th
Cir. 1966) (en bane) (state board of education); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th
Cir. 1963) (en bane) (school boards); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala.
1972); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (state officials).
117. 484 F.2d at 1338.
118. 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
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suit where it has been concluded that attorneys' fees should be awarded un-
less there is specific reason for denial."19 As in the civil rights area, the court
felt that only concerned citizens could assure full compliance with the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act. This case seems inconsistent with the hold-
ing of the Supreme Court in Mills and Hall, because although a substantial
benefit existed, 120 the awarding of fees to unvictorious plaintiffs would en-
courage frivolous and harrassing actions.
In addition to actions challenging administrative decisions, the Mills-Hall
doctrine could also authorize fee shifting in private actions directly against a
violating party, especially in the consumer protection and pollution control
areas where injunctive relief against the violator is often the only relief avail-
able. Both environmental and consumer protection lawyers are reluctant to
bring suits involving only injunctive relief because such actions generate no
damages from which a percentage contingent fee may be extracted. 12  How-
ever, under the substantial benefit doctrine large damage awards would not be
a prerequisite to the recovery of adequate fees and thus private injunctive
actions would become a practical option. Even though the parties in the
private injunctive action typically lack the formal relationship that existed be-
tween the stockholder and corporation in Mills and the member and union in
Hall, the same policy considerations of therapeutic benefit derived from stat-
utory enforcement underlie both situations. The emphasis should be placed
on ,the receipt of a recognized benefit by persons other than the plaintiff
rather than the mere presence of a formal relationship between the plaintiff
and those benefited. 122 In the aftermath of Hall v. Cole'23 it would appear
that injunctive, law enforcing suits are now practical in a whole range of areas
irrespective of the lack of a damage award. Yet, even if a damage award
is authorized, the fee incentive of the Mills-Cole doctrines can be important
where the insufficiency of the potential award results in minimum use of
these authorized suits.' 24
If the language of the substantial benefit doctrine is as broad and unlimited
in scope as the Supreme Court has indicated in Mills and Hall, then the benefit
rationale cannot be limited to causes of action arising under legislation. The
substantial benefit exception created by Abrams and Bosch and expanded
by Hall is a judicially created exception to the anti-fee-shifting doctrine.
In ,these cases legislative intent has been considered only to determine
119. Id. at 848.
120. The substantial benefit realized by the suit was that the filing of the action
helped insure that information concerning the project and measures taken to protect the
environment would be available to the public.
121. Comment, supra note 7, at 330. See also Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-
Part 1: Considerations of Equity, 49 B.U.L. REv. 211, 212 (1969).
122. See Comment, supra note 7, at 330-31.
123. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
124. A typical example is the Civil Rights Act which authorizes civil actions for
damages under §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1970). The
courts have used these statutes to protect freedom of assembly, Haque v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939), and freedom from unreasonable search, Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16
(9th Cir. 1965). However, the insufficiency of the potential award has resulted in lim-
ited use of these authorized suits. See Note, Civil Actions for Damages Under the Fed-
eral Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 1015, 1035 (1967). The fee incentive of
the Mills-Cole doctrine provides these statutes with the effectiveness which Congress in-
tended them to have when they were enacted.
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whether Congress has acted to circumscribe the courts' equity power to use
this exception to justify an award of counsel fees. The court-created ex-
ception is 'the basis of the award, not -the statute. Thus, if the elements of
the Mills-Hall doctrine are present, and if law enforcement is the acknowl-
edged benefit, there is no reason to doubt that fee shifting would be ap-
propriate in suits based solely upon common law.
If the courts apply the substantial benefit doctrine to suits enforcing judi-
cially made law, -the need for more precise guidelines for determining the
presence of the elements of the Mills-Hall doctrine become evident. For
example, consider 'a hypothetical whereby corporation A contracts to sell a
parcel of land to corporation B, yet A refuses to convey title. B success-
fully brings a suit against A for specific performance of the contract. Clearly,
by enforcing the contract, B is enforcing the "law." However, this is not the
type of law enforcement which amounts to a substantial benefit to an ascer-
tainable class. By making corporation A pay corporation B's 'attorneys' fees,
the class benefited by the action contributes to the costs and is, therefore,
not ,unjustly enriched. The shareholders of A and the shareholders of B are
the two ascertainable classes affected by the suit. However, the law of
contracts on which B depends was designed to protect and benefit the buyer
of the land, not the seller. Thus, the purpose of the law is to protect the
shareholders of B, not the shareholders of A. It can be argued that compli-
ance rather than noncompliance with the law better advantaged corporation
A and its stockholders. 125 However, forcing A to convey land does not satisfy
the Mills requirement of substantiality in that it does not correct an abuse
which is detrimental to the essential rights of the shareholders of A. In
Mills the statute protected an essential right of the shareholders by prevent-
ing misleading proxy statements, and in Hall the statute preserved the union
member's freedom of speech, not only a vital union right, but also a funda-
mental constitutional right. The enforcement of the hypothetical real estate
contract does not protect a right equivalent to those protected in Mills and
Hall. Also, the effect on the shareholders of A or B fails to meet the second
test for substantiality in that it is merely "technical" in nature. Furthermore,
even if a substantial benefit to the shareholders B were present, forcing A
to pay B's counsel fees would not force the class benefited by the action
(shareholders of B) to contribute to the costs, and, therefore, another essen-
tial element of the Mills test would be lacking. If -the hypothetical were
changed so that the contract were between individuals rather than corpora-
tions, there would be no ascertainable class to be benefited. Since the great
majority of contracts are between individuals or corporations, the courts
should determine that the substantial benefit doctrine has little applicability
to the law of contracts.
,On first consideration, it 'appears that a broad application of the Mills-Cole
doctrine will clog already congested courts with additional suits, since com-
pensatory ,and injunctive relief otherwise unavailable would now be available.
Certainly, more suits will be filed, ,but countering this negative result will be
125. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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an increased willingness by the corporate defendant to compromise and set-
tle just claims prior to trial. The result should not be an increase in actual
trial time, but instead, only those suits which present legal or factual issues
worthy of litigation will be decided by the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The logic, principles, and language of the substantial benefit exception
adopted by Mills and expanded by Hall are very broad. For a successful
plaintiff to receive an award of attorneys' fees under the Mills test it is only
necessary that: (1) his action confer a substantial benefit on the members
of an ascertainable class; (2) an award of counsel fees operates to spread
the costs proportionately among the members of the benefited class so that
they are not unjustly enriched; and (3) if the cause of action arises under
legislation, such legislation does not "meticulously" detail the remedies. To
be substantial, the alleged benefit must be more than technical in its con-
sequence to the benefited class and it must correct or prevent an abuse which
is detrimental to ,an essential right of the members of the class. Law en-
forcement has been held to be a substantial benefit.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to delineate precise guidelines and
limitations for interpretation of the elements of the Mills test, especially the
importance of the law being enforced to those protected by it. Currently,
the enforcement of any law satisfies the substantial benefits requirement.
Therefore, since the substantial benefit rationale is judicially created and
legislative intent has been considered only to determine if the courts' equity
power has been circumscribed, the broad interpretation of law enforcement
permits the exception to be applied to common law actions. However, such
an application overlooks the fact that the Mills and Hall decisions were
based on federal statutes which the Congress of the United States enacted
after debate and deliberation and which may be presumed to benefit sub-
stantially the class of individuals which the legislation is designed to pro-
tect. Enforcement of judicially made common law does not enjoy such a
presumption. The enforcement of every law should not satisfy the substan-
tial benefit requirement, and the courts must either differentiate the import-
ance of the laws being enforced or else confine the exception to actions
arising under legislation. Even if the exception is confined to legislation,
more precise guidelines for determining the presence of the other elements
of the Mills test should be developed.
The Supreme Court's ratification and liberalization of the substantial
benefit exception is a significant challenge to the traditional American rule,
and the interpretation of the law enforcement policy imperatives of Mills and
Hall by the lower courts will determine its success. By Supreme Court man-
date the substantial benefit exception should be applied to actions arising un-
der federal legislation with the exception of those that meticulously detail
the remedies available. Likewise, in suits arising under state legislation, at-
torneys should take the initiative to plead the substantial benefit rationale.
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If the courts allow -the application of this exception to state legislation, the
traditional rule will be weakened to the extent that it will no longer be the
general rule. A further extension of the substantial benefit doctrine to com-
mon law actions might result in the creation of a new American rule which
would award attorneys' fees to the successful plaintiff.
